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The terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was one of 
Europe’s most innovative and vicious terrorist groups for many decades.  
Seeking Basque independence from Spain and France, it employed a 
socialist political ideology to further its political aims.  In 2011, ETA ceased 
carrying out acts of political violence even though its political goals 
remained unfulfilled.  After 50 years and over 800 casualties, ETA gave up 
its armed struggle due to lack of popular support for armed struggle and 
a paucity of political leverage within Basque society.
Basque journalist and professor of journalism Imanol Murua (Ph.D.) 
explains the myriad nuances that only a seasoned insider can provide 
to guide the reader through how ETA went from one of the most 
feared terrorist groups in Europe to a non-violent (since 2011) political 
organization nearly bereft of political power in its own homeland.  Murua 
interviewed ETA members, Basque political leaders, Spanish judges, 
former Spanish government officials, and international mediators to spin 
a fascinating tapestry of ETA’s history and politics within Spanish (and 
to a much lesser degree French) society, with an eye on how all of these 
factors were woven together. 
Murua displays a brilliant command of his topic and with consummate skill 
outlines the at times byzantine interplay between ETA, Basque political 
factions, the Spanish government, Spanish political parties, and Spanish 
leaders.  On the one hand, as a Basque, he wears his ethnicity on his 
sleeve as he often highlights what he refers to as Spanish government 
abuse of power such as torture, anti-Basque death squads, unlawful 
arrests and detention, murder, and other human rights violations. On the 
other hand, he acknowledges that ETA carried out numerous terrorist acts 
over multiple decades, but mentions them almost as an afterthought.  In 
so doing, he seemingly downplays the outright barbarity and ingenuity 
with which ETA conducted a terror campaign in search of their desired 
political solution.  The political aims are well chronicled and masterfully 
outlined.  However, the sheer acumen and formidable creativity of ETA as 
a terrorist group only garner a passing mention. 
ETA came into being during the regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco 
(1936-1975). During these years, ETA cultivated an image as “freedom 
fighters” that gained widespread traction in Basque circles, as well as 
in some of the more politically liberal Spanish political circles due to its 
anti-Franco stance and embrace of Socialist dogma.  While outlining the 
political strategic political significance of ETA’s assassination of Admiral 
Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973, Murua does not describe the operation, which 
is a classic terrorism case study widely respected for its brilliance and 
economic simplicity.
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After Franco’s death, ETA continued on as before due in part to the 
fact that although Spain was evolving into a fledgling democracy, the 
political and judicial structures in place were leftovers of the Franco 
era and continued his policies towards ETA and factions advocating 
Basque nationalism.  Murua states that this continuation of anti-ETA and 
anti-Basque Francoist policies included widespread political repression, 
death squads, police abuses, and torture even into the tenure of Socialist 
Felipe Gonzalez.  He further alleges that the Spanish media and political 
structure turned a blind eye to these events. 
ETA followed a strategy of action-repression-action in the 1970s.  ETA 
would conduct a terrorist attack (action), which would in turn provoke an 
indiscriminant action by the Spanish government (repression), that would 
then cause the Basque populace to rise up against Spain (action). That 
would then grant ETA more credibility.  In the short term, it worked well, 
but in the long term it failed.
 In the 1980s, ETA switched to a strategy of attrition.  The thinking was 
that violence would eventually lead the Spanish government to realize 
the need for a political end and negotiate with ETA.  While the Spanish 
government conducted many negotiations over the years with ETA, the 
end result was eventually no forward movement for Basque autonomy.
Spanish-French cross-border collaboration beginning in the 1980s, 
including Spanish Civil Guard ability to pursue Basque terrorists into 
France, weakened ETA.  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Spanish authorities leveraged this international sentiment to further 
marginalize ETA politically.
Over the years, as ETA was socially delegitimized, Spanish political leaders 
used this serendipitous opportunity as leverage to delegitimize Basque 
nationalism, which in turn led to ETA’s loss of influence in Basque politics.  
As the political backing decreased, ETA’s options narrowed.  Murua 
explains that ETA’s campaign of violence eventually led to loss of support 
within the very Basque political structure they claimed to represent and 
defined “the end of ETA’s violent campaign as a failure rather than as 
a defeat” (150).  Seeing that they could not win a military conflict, ETA 
began to seek a political solution. 
ETA realized that violence in pursuit of its political aims had failed.  After 
decades of a political-military strategy of attrition that brought no 
results, attempts at negotiation failed as well.  Despite many attempts 
over a multi-year period to negotiate with the Spanish government, 
each failure weakened ETA’s political footing while strengthening that of 
Madrid.  The French government refused to negotiate, claiming that ETA 
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was an external issue.  The Spanish government refused to negotiate, 
understanding that proceeding from a position of strength, ETA’s political 
capital would eventually evaporate.  
“When ETA decided to lay down its arms in October 2011, it had the 
capacity to carry on a military campaign. It had a leadership, cells, a 
network, money, and guns. The Basque group had not been entirely 
crushed by police force and judicial persecution. It had not been  
defeated by repression.  However, repression weakened ETA and 
gradually diminished its capacity to commit attack. For a group not fond 
of acknowledging the effectiveness of state repression, this was a telling 
testimony. ETA itself recognized that it was suffering a crisis in military 
and operational terms” (167).
While Murua’s work is a history of sorts, he laces his work heavily with 
political science  theories (Martha Crenshaw, Martin Libicki, David 
Rapoport), incorporating miniature comparisons with other European 
terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Italian 
Red Brigades, and the German Red Army Faction.  Like many European 
terrorist groups advocating socialism, they lost varying degrees of 
impetus after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the implosion of 
the Soviet empire (1991) since the ideological drivers in Moscow had 
turned their attention to governance issues in a newly established 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the challenges and 
opportunities of a post-Cold War environment.
In spite of the flaws mentioned above, this book is a must read for 
analysts and students alike.  Murua’s masterpiece stands out as one 
of the best definitive works on ETA and rightly deserves a prominent 
place on the bookshelf or syllabus for seeking to better understand the 
intersection of terrorism, history, sociology, political science, psychology, 
and anthropology.
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